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ABSTRACT
Many societies now face the problem of hate speech. It has reached the level of a global
problem. Many groups use freedom of expression to oppress other groups through using
hate speech. The problem of hate speech represents a complex topic because it is
interwind with the right of freedom of expression. However, international human rights
law tries to combat the hate speech law in some treaties, such as the ICCPR and CERD,
by offering rules to guide states constitutional courts in adjudicating these cases by
limiting some of their absolute discretionary power in deciding these cases. These efforts
have not led to comprehensive rules against hate speech. Therefore, countries have
adopted two approaches to organize the right of freedom of expression and their
restriction of hate speech. The US approach grants the freedom of expression without any
restriction on hate speech. Meanwhile, the ECHR has adopted an approach that restricts
hate speech in many cases. The main effects of these contradictions are two models that
offer different approaches to the hate speech problem. The study of freedom of
expression rights and its restrictions in these two models is essential to know the
justifications for hate speech protection and refuted by literature and court cases. This
paper illustrates the main IHRL treaties that organize the freedom of expression rights
and its restrictions to explain the hate speech problem's origin. The US doctrine is
explained by illustrating cases and opinions which support this system. The critical race
theory and feminist scholarship opinions which call for restricting hate speech are
analyzed. They reject hate speech because it increases racism and discrimination in
society and supports hate speech restriction. This paper also views the ECHR cases that
adopt the same approach. This paper argues that hate speech should be restricted because
it causes harm to individuals and society.
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I. Introduction
Nowadays, in our world, many problems are shared among different countries. Due to the
spread of the internet and modern technology, many problems are common in societies
despite their differences. The spread of extreme and racist speech is now seen as a
common problem that many countries try to find a solution for. Hate speech is a difficult
problem because it intersects with the right of freedom of expression. Many international
conventions illustrate that freedom of expression is a basic right that states must protect.
These conventions grant this right to protect the people’s right to speak and express their
ideas. In spite of the importance of this right, these treaties do not grant this right without
restriction. Many international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) offer some restrictions on speech. They use varied approaches to
treating the problem of hate speech. This paper calls for unifying the global response to
the hate speech problem. This is an institutional project in which I argue that the
international human rights law (IHRL) should provide standards to guide states, and their
domestic courts, especially the Constitutional courts, on how they should react to
freedom of expression and imposes some restrictions on hate speech. This is a specific
example of a more general problem that Constitutional courts face in any country.
Constitutional courts try to balance the rights of some people and counter
societal/minority interests. Therefore, IHRL provides global rules and approaches to limit
the discretionary power of these courts on deciding such cases. However, many authors
criticize the current IHRL framework as it lacks unified standard rules to guide states in
fighting this problem. 1
Two models treat the problem of hate speech. A state such as the US has adopted
a doctrine of almost absolute protection for the freedom of expression, which has led to
the protection of hate speech and incitement to discrimination based on racial and ethnic
grounds. 2 Other regimes, such as the European Union regime, implements another view
MICHEAL ROSENFELD, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence A Comparative Analysis in THE
CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING REGULATION AND RESPONSES,
at 248, (edited by Michael Herz and Peter Molnar, Cambridge University Press) (2012).
2
Id.
1

that protects the freedom of expression and restricts hate and racial speech. 3 I explore
these two regimes, mainly because they respond differently to hate speech. While the US
doctrine protects hate speech, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) restricts this
speech based on the harms it inflicts on society. I explain these two regimes' views by
illustrating the relevant explanation and the theories that support both regimes. The
different organizations of freedom of expression and hate speech raise essential
questions: Should freedom of expression and its restrictions be applied differently? Or
should the freedom of expression be granted without any restriction even though it
inflicts harm?
These questions are critical because the various approaches to freedom of
expression protection led to the spread of hate in these societies. I illustrate the problem
of hate speech and the right to free speech in three legal frameworks: IHRL, US case law
and doctrine, and ECHR cases. It is crucial to analyze hate speech in the IHRL
framework because this system guides states, especially their Constitutional courts, with
many substantive rules to be followed by constitutional judges in adjudicating freedom of
expression cases and hate speech cases. These rules are only essential because they limit
some of the courts' discretion in deciding such cases. It is important to explain that the
IHRL treaties, such as the ICCPR and CERD, use different approaches toward the hate
speech problem and offer rules to end this problem. 4 Therefore, I explain the IHRL
framework, which organizes the freedom of expression right and its restriction, to see
why this system functions this way. Also, it is useful to explain US doctrine and cases
and the ECHR cases because the two systems are completely opposite, as explained.
They both offer a different approach to freedom of expression rights as both systems treat
hate speech differently. For these reasons, I explore these systems to understand why they
function this way.

TOBY MENDEL, Does International Law Provide for Consistent Rules on Hate Speech? in THE
CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING REGULATION AND RESPONSES, at 422, (edited by
Michael Herz and Peter Molnar, Cambridge University Press) (2012).
4
Natalie Alkiviadou, The Legal Regulation of Hate Speech: The International and European Frameworks,
55, 4, Croatian Political Science Review, at 216 (2018).
3

2

In this paper, I argue that hate speech should be restricted because it imposes
harm on victims of this speech and makes them suffer. Freedom of expression is not an
excuse to protect hate speech. This harm is unrepairable. This harm degrades victims and
makes them feel unequal to other members of society. I propose that the harm inflicted on
victims offers a solid justification for the restriction of hate speech. This illustration
explains some critiques of freedom of expression in the literature using critical race and
feminist theory. I use critical race theory and the feminist theory framework to explore
the harm affecting hate speech victims. Also, ECHR cases are used as examples to see
how this court has applied the restriction of hate speech to offer protection from hate
speech.
In part II, the IHRL framework toward hate speech shows how this system offers
rules to guide states on how they are supposed to treat the hate speech problem. However,
this system is criticized by literature because it lacks a unified approach to the problem of
hate speech. Part III explores how the US doctrine justifies the absolute protection of
hate speech by discussing the literature and case law that supports this view. Part IV
analyzes the opinions which call for the restriction of hate speech. I explain the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decisions against hate speech as this court adopts a welldeveloped doctrine against hate speech and offers an alternative approach to the hate
speech problem. Part V concludes by suggesting that hate speech should be restricted,
and states should be aware that hate speech represents a grave threat to society.
Therefore, states should rethink their current approach to fighting hate speech.

3

II.

Hate speech restriction in IHRL: vague rules and lack of comprehensive

approach toward the hate speech problem
The international human rights law (IHRL) is well-developed with substantive rules that
seek to guarantee the right of the freedom of expression and, at the same time, has
developed rules to restrict hate speech. These rules are general rules that seek to control
the states’ constitutional court discretionary power in treating such cases. Usually, in
deciding cases related to freedom of expression and hate speech, constitutional courts
balance the rights of the people to speak and the duty to protect people from the negative
outcome of this speech. Therefore, IHRL proposes some rules to limit this power and
offers unified rules to unify international practice. This is the official story. In reality,
IHRL's current rules against hate speech do little to fight this problem. Although many
IHRL rules are against incitement toward violence or racial acts, threatening society's
peace or safety, these rules are ineffective against hate speech. The lack of consistent
rules against hate speech is due to the absence of a clear vision in IHRL treaties toward
fighting the hate speech problem. Also, there is no standard approach on the exact
essence of the right of freedom of expression and the supposed restrictions on hate
speech.
In this chapter, I argue that IHRL lacks consistent rules against hate speech and
offers limited rules to fight this problem to guide the states’ constitutional courts in
adjudicating such cases of hate speech. To explain this argument, in the first section, I
illustrate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) preparation history to illustrate states'
disagreements on the restrictions of hate speech which led to fragments in these texts.
Also, this section focuses on the main critiques of the ICCPR approach toward the hate
speech problem. In the second section, I explain the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) approach against hate speech. Although this
treaty offers a rule that can be effective against racist speech to guide states’ courts in
cases of racism speech, it does not offer a comprehensive approach toward the hate
speech problem. In the third section, I conclude that different approaches toward hate
speech led to confusion on a precise definition of hate speech and the approach that states

4

should follow to treat it. For this reason, treaties do not fight the hate speech problem
properly.
A. UDHR and ICCPR articles on the prohibition of hate speech: many debates and
lack of unified view
The UDHR and ICCPR comprise the main IHRL corpus. They both offer many rules and
principles that states should follow in their relationship with their citizens. They illustrate
the states' main rights and obligations toward individuals and are considered an important
step towards organizing the main human rights that are agreed upon by states. 5 Although
these legal texts are essential instruments for granting the freedom of expression and
restricting hate speech, they both criticize for lacking a unified legal framework against
hate speech. 6 The UDHR and ICCPR do not offer a straightforward way to fight the hate
speech problem due to various reasons related to these texts' vagueness and the lack of a
straightforward approach toward fighting the hate speech problem. To explain this, I
introduce some of the historical debates between states in forming these treaties to
understand the origin of such vagueness. Then I explain why ICCPR text does not offer a
clear path against hate speech prohibition.
1.UDHR preparation and the fatal mistake of ignoring restricting hate speech
Article 19 of the UDHR adopts a clear rule to protect the freedom of expression right, but
it lacks text to restrict hate speech. Article 19 declares:
1.Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice. 7

TARLACH MCGONAGLE, The development of freedom of expression and information within the UN:
leaps and bounds or fits and starts? in THE UNITED NATIONS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
AND INFORMATION: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, at 6 (edited by Tarlach McGonagle, Yvonne
Cambridge University Press) ( 2015).
6
Supra note 1, at. 216.
7
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A(II), U.N. Doc. A/8 10, at 71
(1948).
5

5

This declaration leaves the restriction on hate speech to the general limitation, which is
stated in article 7 and article 29/2.

8

Article 29/2 illustrates some of the general

restrictions on the rights stated in this declaration:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only
to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others
and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the
general welfare in a democratic society. 9
Article 7 adopts the equality principle before the law and equal protection by the law.
Stephanie Farrior interprets the principle of equality as a principle for protection against
hate speech. 10 Also, article 7 in the Declaration calls for the prohibition of incitement to
discrimination. Article 29 explains that the limitation on rights is "due recognition and
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society." From this
illustration, UDHR avoids adopting a text against hate speech or restriction on freedom of
expression, which is a fatal mistake. To understand why there is no explicit prohibition
on hate speech in the UDHR, we must look into the preparation of the UDHR. The
preparation of the UDHR provides insight into the different views that states have
adopted on the freedom of expression right and its restrictions. These debates explain that
the lack of a unified version against hate speech is deeply rooted in the international
system.
In the formation of the UDHR, there were two views toward hate speech; the first
group of countries argued for the respect of freedom of expression and refused any text
which would hinder this right. The other group called for adopting an explicit rule against
racist and discriminatory speech. On the one hand, during the preparation of article 7,
countries adopted different views on this article, organizing the equality principle
between people. Countries disagreed about whether the equality principle and not
discrimination must include protection from incitement to discrimination or not. 11 There
Stephanie Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of
International Law concerning Hate Speech, 14, 1 BERKELEY J. INT'l L. at 11 (1996).
9
Supra note 7.
10
Id.at 14.
11
Id. at13.
8
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was a debate between the USSR, China, and Australian representatives and US
representatives about adopting a provision to prohibit discrimination based on race,
religion, and nationality. 12 The USSR representative called for penalizing the act of
discrimination and advocacy for such an act. He stated that their article should include
“any advocacy of national, racial and religious hostility or of national exclusiveness or
hatred and contempt, as well as any action establishing a privilege or a discrimination
based on distinctions of race, nationality or religion, constitute a crime and shall be
punishable under the law of the State.” 13The US representative Eleanor Roosevelt
claimed that “her Government would be opposed to the introduction of the Soviet Union
proposal in the Declaration, She did not think that a law such as that proposed by the
Soviet Union representative could be applied in practice, and cited the prohibition law in
the United States as an example.” 14 However, countries adopted article 7 after voting
between countries without requiring states to criminalize discrimination or incitement to
such an act.
From this debate, we can understand an apparent disagreement on the incitement
to discrimination prohibition as one of the commonly defined elements of hate speech.
Furthermore, adopting a restriction on article 19 divided states, this article is about
protecting the right of freedom of expression. States debated on adopting an explicit
prohibition on speech that calls for fascism and racial superiority. The USSR and France
representatives proposed to adopt the limitations on the freedom of expression. 15 These
“clauses were rejected by the majority, which viewed the general limitations clause
(Article 29) as sufficient.” 16 The US representative rejected these restriction clauses, and
“when Article 19 was discussed in the U.N. General Assembly, the Soviets once again
sought to reintroduce more detailed restrictive amendments, which were rejected without
discussion at the request of Mrs. Roosevelt.” 17 We can see how the US has a persistent
opinion that rejects the restrictions on freedom of expression. In the voting process, other
Id. at14.
Id. at 15, 16.
14
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Document. EICN.4/SR.34, 12/12/1947 at 10, available at:
http://undocs.org/E/CN.4/SR.34. [accessed 26 February 2021].
15
Id. at 20.
16
Id. at 20.
17
Id. at 20.
12
13

7

countries' representatives approved the US proposal. From these debates, we can see that
during the formulation of the main and the most prominent legal text that declared the
rights and duties upon people, states could not agree on the prohibition of hate speech.
This is a fatal mistake because it normalizes the existence of hate speech. Although the
UHDR adopts a clear article against incitement for discrimination, it lacks restrictions on
other types of hate speech and racist speech.
Therefore, I can deduce that various states did not accept the idea of restricting
freedom of expression at that time, and only a few countries warned about the hate
speech problem. Although subsequent international treaties restricted the freedom of
expression, hate speech is accepted without a straightforward, comprehensive approach
against this, as we shall see later.
2. ICCPR meaningless rules against hate speech
The ICCPR is supposed to be an essential instrument for granting the freedom of
expression and restricting hate speech; Many authors criticize ICCPR for offering a
meaningless unclear legal framework against hate speech. 18 In this part, I explain that
ICCPR does not offer a straightforward way to fight the hate speech problem due to these
texts' vagueness and the lack of a straightforward approach toward fighting the hate
speech problem. In explaining this argument, it is important to highlight some of the
debates during ICCPR formation among states to highlight why states formed the ICCPR
in this way. Then article 20/2 of ICCPR is analyzed to show that this article is
meaningless in fighting hate speech.
The preparatory work of article 20 of the ICCPR reflects the disagreements and
confusions among states on hate speech prohibition. In this part, I explain some of these
debates to see why states articled the ICCPR in this way. With respect to Article 20/2 of
ICCPR's preparation process, there were many debates between states on the exact extent
of the restrictions on the freedom of expression. Article 20/2 prohibits “any advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility

18

Supra note 1, at. 216.

8

or violence.” 19 The main disagreements between states were about the unclear definition
of the terms of article 20/2, such as incitement to discrimination and hatred. 20 Also, other
countries held that this article threats the right to freedom of expression.
Regarding debates about article 20/2, the US posited that governments could
interpret incitement to discrimination to restrict speech. 21 The US asserted it is enough to
restrict speech that incites violence only. 22 Other countries, such as the USSR, rejected
this view and argued that this article is important to restrict hate speech. The USSR
suggested that article 20 does not provide any rights but an obligation on states to
prohibit propaganda to war, advocating for racial or religious hatred incitement to
discrimination or violence. 23 The US contested this article as it could encourage
censorship. 24 Also, the US explained that article 19/3 was enough to restrict racist speech.
Although this article was adopted, these debates show that many countries disagree with
the US policy of rejecting to restrict hate speech. Furthermore, these historical debates
represent two contradictory approaches toward the treatment of the hate speech problem.
These contradictions hinder efforts to implement a unified policy against hate speech, and
it led to vague legal texts that, in turn, led to fragmentation in the legal order against hate
speech. However, others see this text as offering legal protection against hate speech, and
this text representing most of the principles that states agreed on in treating the hate
speech problem. 25 I disagree with this opinion because the ICCPR’s approach toward
hate speech does not lead to fighting this problem. In the next part, I illustrate some of the
legal fragments of this Convention to explain that article 20/2 is pointless against hate
speech prohibition.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; S. Exec. Doc. E,
95-2 (1978); S. Treaty Doc. 95-20; 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
20
MICHAEL O’FLAHERTY, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: interpreting freedom of
expression and information standards for the present and the future, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND INFORMATION: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, at 62 (edited by
Tarlach McGonagle, Yvonne Donders, Cambridge University Press) (2015).
21
Id. at 63.
22
Supra note 8, at 25.
23
Supra note 20, at 63.
24
Id. 63.
25
Thomas J. Webb, Verbal Poison - Criminalizing Hate Speech: A Comparative Analysis and
a Proposal for the American System, 50 Washburn L.J. at 450-451 (2011).
19

9

Relating to the ICCPR criticisms, the main critiques I focus on are related to
Article 20/2 of ICCPR. This article is considered the main article that offers a restriction
on speech and engages with the problem of hate speech directly, unlike article 19, which
describes the right and proposes a certain restriction. Article 20 offers a different
approach against extreme speech. Michel Rosenfeld argues that Article 20/2 lacks the
definition of many terms such as advocacy for hatred, incitement to discrimination or
hostility, and violence. 26 Also, the exact interpretation and the threshold for applying this
article by states brought many legal concerns.
On the one hand, Jeroen Temperman criticizes Article 20 for using vague language
to tackle the hate speech problem. This article does not require countries to prohibit
hateful speech per se, but it prohibits the advocacy of national, racial speech, which
constitutes incitement that leads to discrimination, hostility, or violence. 27 He rejects
Such a formula because the words of article 20/2, such as advocacy, incitement, and
religious hatred, are vague. 28 The ICCPR lacks the exact definition of the advocacy for
racial or national or religious hatred. The word advocacy is not clear because it does not
determine what advocacy means. Is advocacy about the promotion of racial ideas only, or
can it include the speech that supports such speech? 29
There are some authors and NGOs who have tried to define advocacy. For example,
the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion
and expression submitted a report to the General Assembly which defines advocacy of
hate speech “as explicit, intentional, public and active support and promotion of hatred
towards the target group.” 30 The problem with this definition is that it does not clearly
define the meaning of active support and the threshold for the active support

Supra note 1, at 214- 215.
JEROEN TEMPERMAN, RELIGIOUS HATRED AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
PROHIBITION OF INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE OR DISCRIMINATION, at 181, Cambridge
University Press (2016).
28
Id, at 168.
29
Supra note 1, at 214.
30
UN General Assembly, Promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression,
para. 44(b), 6 September 2012, A/67/357, available at: https://undocs.org/A/67/357 [accessed 5 March
2021].
26
27

10

requirements. 31 Also, Jeroen Temperman suggests that the advocacy for racial or
national, or religious hatred must be delivered in a public forum and speaker must be
intended to prompt a certain action such as violence, discrimination, or hatred. 32 The
report of the Special Rapporteur accepted this definition requiring in the definition of
advocacy to discrimination or hatred three elements: “explicit, intentional, public.” 33
Many authors reject this definition because this interpretation does not cover advocacy of
racial or national hatred in the private sphere. 34 I think this could lead to a limited
application for the law that organizes the advocacy to hatred or discrimination.
Furthermore, like the disagreements on the definition of advocacy, national, racial,
and religious hatred also brought about the considerable controversy on the exact
meaning of hatred. Temperman argues that this word needs to be defined in the light of
the emotional effects it brings to victims.

35

It has been proposed by the report of the

Special Rapporteur that hatred can be defined “as a state of mind characterized as intense
and irrational emotions of opprobrium, enmity and detestation towards the target
group.” 36 However, Temperman criticizes this interpretation because it links the speech
with a certain kind of emotion. 37 This definition is not accurate because hate speech can
be emotionless, and hate speech that does not affect feeling cannot be prohibited by states
accordingly to this definition. 38 In addition, the word incitement to discrimination,
hostility, or violence is not clear enough to show what constitutes incitement and the
threshold for this act. 39 Also, it is unclear if the incitement to violence and discrimination
requires certain results or whether it is enough that the act will likely cause discrimination
or violence. 40

Supra note 1, at 215.
Supra note 27, at 169.
33
Supra note 30, para. 44(b).
34
Supra note 27, at 172.
35
Id. at 173.
36
Supra note 30, para. 44(a).
37
Supra note 27, at 173.
38
Id at 172- 174.
39
Rebecca Meyer, Pursuing a Universal Threshold for Regulating Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility
or Violence, 44 Brook. J. Int'l L. at 310 (2018).
40
Supra note 27, at 181.
31
32
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There have been some attempts by IOS representatives and NGOs to define
incitement. For instance, the Special Rapporteur report defines incitement as "statements
about national, racial or religious groups that create an imminent risk of discrimination,
hostility or violence against persons belonging to those groups.” 41 ARTICLE 19, an NGO
concerned with human rights problems, defines the prohibition of incitement to hatred
and discrimination by using many criteria to evaluate speech, such as the speaker's intent,
the context, and the likelihood of violence. It defines protected group from this speech in
a non-exhaustive list, including “ race, gender, ethnicity, religion or belief, disability, age,
sexual orientation, language political or other opinion, national or social origin,
nationality, property, birth or other status colour.” 42 However, these definitions are
intended for the broadening of the scope of article 20/2, which contradicts the states'
intention. 43 Moreover, these definitions restrict the free speech right. 44 ARTICLE 19's
definition contradicts the states' intention because states agree on prohibiting advocacy
for extreme speech, which are national, racial, or religious hatred, only without adding
other elements such as racial exclusiveness. 45 These criteria also have led to a divergent
application for the restriction imposed in article 20/2 because some states may follow
these criteria, and others may not follow this approach. 46 Furthermore, the UN special
rapporteur approach leads to suffocating free speech and disconfirming ICCPR
principles, which protects speech that does not cause harm. 47
Regarding the exact requirement of incitement, many authors disagree on its
relation to haters and its exact meaning. One opinion calls for a relationship between
hatred that constitutes incitement; Ghanea argues that the courts or prosecution must
establish hatred before these authorities can treat this speech as incitement to
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discrimination, hostility, or violence. 48 If the speech calls for national or racist hatred
only without incitement to discrimination or violence, article 20/2 does not prohibit this
speech in this case. 49 This article uses a different approach from article 19/3, as the latter
restricts speech if it is only against the rights of others, national security, or public order.
Article 19/3 restrictions to the speech are applied immediately if the speech violates these
restrictions; Article 20/2 requires the incitement to discrimination to result from hatred. 50
Another opinion thinks that incitement is unclear in ICCPR and suggests deferring to
national systems to define incitement. Toby Mendel posits that incitement must lead to
certain result “and to define it narrowly as requiring a close nexus between the statements
and the engendering of the proscribed result, which, pursuant to Article 20(2) of the
ICCPR, is violence, discrimination, or hostility.” 51 He illustrates that the US adopts this
definition “in Brandenburg v. Ohio, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment prohibits restrictions on advocacy of crime, except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.” 52 From these contradictions on the exact definitions of
words of article 20/2 of ICCPR, it is clear that this article is useless against the hate
speech problem. We can trace this problem to the preparation process as countries
disagreed on many concepts that this article must cover. Therefore, I believe these
contradictions led countries to refrain from meeting their international obligation in
article 20 by refusing to adopt a clear law against hate speech. In the next part, I explain
the CERD to illustrate its approach against hate speech to explain that CERD has offered
prominent rules against racist speech contrary to ICCPR rules.
B. The CERD approach fighting racism: prominent rules but limited application
The CERD Convention unifies international efforts to combat racism and offers a legal
obligation upon countries to prohibit and criminalize such an act. In this Convention,
Article 4 organizes the criminalization of racist speech or incitement for such an act. This
Nazila Ghanea, Expression and Hate Speech in the ICCPR: Compatible or Clashing, 5 Religion & Hum.
Rts. at 188 (2010).
49
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Convention illustrates the prohibition of racist speech in a much more detailed and
comprehensive illustration. 53 Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) declares that:
[S]tates Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are
based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons
of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote
racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt
immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to,
or acts of, such discrimination. 54
This article requires states to adopt laws to prohibit and criminalize the “dissemination of
ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as
all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of
another colour or ethnic origin.” 55
Article 4 obligates states to adopt a law against propaganda to discrimination and
incitement to offense and adopts civil remedies for incitement to discrimination.
Although the CERD convention adopts a narrow view toward restricting racist speech
only, this treaty imposed an obligation to penalize racist speech. CERD obligates states to
criminalize the dissemination of racist ideas and incitement for hatred and discrimination,
which extends the mere obligation of ICCPR to prohibit acts of “advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence.” 56 While the prominent views of this Convention to unify the international
efforts against racism in general and to combat racist speech specifically, there are many
uncertainties in the approach adopted by this Convention to fight hate speech. This
vagueness is related to the exact definition of racist speech and the requirements of the
intention as an element of the crime of incitement to discrimination. In this section, I
explain that the CERD is a good step in fighting racist speech. However, some opinions
suggest that this treaty is unclear. I explain some of the counter-arguments offered by
CERD General recommendation and opinions in the literature on these considerations.
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The main criticism against the CERD convention approach is that this Convention
does not define racist speech or incitement to discrimination. This hinders the restriction
of racist speech as states may refrain from implementing their obligation under this treaty
because it is vague. 57 I disagree with this opinion because General Recommendation
number 35 of 2013 offers a framework to define racist speech. Concerning the criticism
of this Convention, Patrick Thornberry argues that racist speech as a term is not defined
by CERD articles, which affects the treaty's primary purpose to restrict this speech.
Patrick Thornberry contests article 4 of CERD because it tries to describe the racist
speech most superficially, which led to a too general and incomplete text. 58 However, I
think the general recommendation offers an interpretation of this article.
Concerning the definition of racist speech, Article 35 of the General
recommendation calls for general requirements to identify racist speech. These
requirements are about defining the very act of racist speech, the definition of incitement,
and some of the proposed circumstances that infer a racist utterance. Generally speaking,
racist speech means the rejection of “the core human rights principles of human dignity
and equality and seeks to degrade the standing of individuals and groups in the estimation
of society.” 59 The racist speech addresses the following forms of conduct:
(a) All dissemination of ideas based on racial or ethnic superiority or
hatred, by whatever means;
(b) Incitement to hatred, contempt or discrimination against members of
a group on grounds of their race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic
origin;
(c) Threats or incitement to violence against persons or groups on the
grounds in (b) above;
(d) Expression of insults, ridicule or slander of persons or groups or
justification of hatred, contempt or discrimination on the grounds in (b)
above, when it clearly amounts to incitement to hatred or discrimination;
PATRICK THORNBERRY, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination: the prohibition of ‘racist hate speech’, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND INFORMATION: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, at 120 (edited by Tarlach
McGonagle, Yvonne Donders, Cambridge University Press) (2015).
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(e) Participation in organizations and activities which promote and incite
racial discrimination. 60
These acts are adopted by General recommendation No. 35 from article 4 of CERD. This
article covers many acts of racist speech and shows which groups are protected. This
recommendation calls for prohibiting genocide denial and considers this utterance as a
form of racist speech. It suggests “public denials or attempts to justify crimes of genocide
and crimes against humanity, as defined by international law, should be declared as
offences punishable by law, provided that they clearly constitute incitement to racial
violence or hatred.” 61 Although article 4 did not state the prohibition of genocide denials,
this recommendation prohibits such an act as it infers from the CERD that this act is
characterized by “incitement to racial violence or hatred.”
Relating to the definition of incitement, this recommendation defines incitement
and explains its requirements. Incitement means “to influence others to engage in certain
forms of conduct, including the commission of a crime, through advocacy or threats.
Incitement may be express or implied, through actions such as displays of racist symbols
or distribution of materials as well as words.” 62 The recommendation explains that the
incitement to hatred, discrimination, or violence does not require any action as a result of
this incitement. It illustrates that “incitement as an inchoate crime does not require that
the incitement has been acted upon, but in regulating the forms of incitement referred to
in article 4.” 63 The speaker's intention in incitement to hatred, discrimination, or violence
is required as a part of these acts. Therefore, this recommendation asserts that the
incitement in CERD is clear, unlike ICCPR, which is vague.
The context of speech is also an important element to assess whether this speech
is racist speech. This recommendation suggests that racist speech should be evaluated
based on the following elements: “The content and form of speech. The economic, social
and political climate. The position or status of the speaker. The reach of the speech. The
objectives of the speech.” 64 These elements are important in examining racist speech in
Id.at para 13.
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62
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hard cases. Although this treaty does not define racist speech, the CERD General
recommendation defines this kind of speech, which offers an approach to states to follow
in legislating a law against racist speech. Furthermore, these recommendations offer a
threshold and framework to organize the restriction of racist speech by guiding states to
adopt those restrictions which do not contradict the freedom of expression. This
framework does not impose new obligations not previously agreed upon by states. This
recommendation is inspired by article 4. Article 4 is detailed with examples of racist
speech, and it is clear in fight racist speech, so this recommendation broadens the
application of this article to include other aspects of the problem of racist speech to offer
concert protection. The protection from racist speech forms is the main purpose of article
4, and so states designed this article in the form. Therefore, the recommendation
framework is workable in the spirit of and goal of article 4.
Related to the lack of intention as an element in incitement crime, the incitement
to discrimination or the dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred in
article 4 is claimed to lack mens rea as an element in the crime of incitement which is not
accepted; this contradicts the states’ criminal law. 65 Thornberry contends a CERD study
argued that the definition of incitement in CERD article 4 criminalizes the mere act of
incitement carried out regardless of the speaker's intention and the consequences of the
act of incitement 66. This study suggests the dropping of the criminal intention as an
element of incitement:
The extreme speech prohibitions contained in Article 4 ICERD should be
enforced regardless of the precise intentions of the person responsible for
the alleged racist hate speech. For instance, in a 1985 report on Article 4
the Committee bluntly and adamantly states that ‘the mere act of
dissemination is penalized, despite lack of intention to commit an offence
and irrespective of the consequences of the dissemination, whether they
be grave or insignificant. 67
Thornberry rejects this approach because criminal law requires in the crime of the
incitement two conditions which are: the criminal mind - the mens rea- and the
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relationship or causal link between the act of speech and the harm. 68 This study calls
countries to drop these main requirements and to adopt a law that penalizes the mere act
of incitement to racism without the intention to incite. As a result of these objections, this
approach was changed by subsequent general recommendation 35. The interpretation of
crimes illustrated in article 4 of CERD requires proving the speaker's intention to
incitement to discrimination or disseminating ideas based on racial superiority. This
approach was noted in General Recommendation 35, as explained by Temperman
In a paragraph specifically dedicated to the crime of ‘incitement’ the
Committee postulates that State parties should recognize as ‘important
elements’ of this offence ‘the intention of the speaker and the imminent
risk or likelihood that the conduct desired or intended by the speaker will
result from the speech in question. 69
It was an important step that the CERD General recommendations shifted its doctrine.
This approach is flexible so that states could enforce the treaty and confirm their national
laws’ requirements.
I think this approach of the CERD articles and the general recommendations
offer a suitable framework that offers protection from racist speech and preserves the
freedom of expression. Therefore, I conclude that this approach offers a concerted
approach to fight racist speech, and I recommend countries follow it. However, the
international efforts against hate speech do not lead to eliminating this problem. In the
next part, I explain some of the reasons for the ongoing challenges in fighting hate
speech.
C. IHRL and the lost opportunities to offer unified legal rules against hate speech
From the above illustration, I can conclude that there is no unified approach in IHRL to
tackle the hate speech problem. Therefore, many questions have been raised by literature
about the effectiveness of IHRL rules toward hate speech. These opinions question the
IHRL approach toward the hate speech problem. Many authors argue that these treaties
do not offer a unified approach toward hate speech. The IHRL rules are ineffective in
countering hate speech and are not clear enough to guide the states facing this problem. I
68
69
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argue that the IHRL treaties are designed in this manner and do not offer a unified
approach to fight hate speech. IHRL treaties chose different paths in facing hate speech,
and these treaties lack a comprehensive view to eliminating this problem. There are four
main criticisms of the IHRL framework. First, these treaties lack the definition of hate
speech. Second, these treaties have adopted different paths to face the hate speech
problem. Third, they have implemented vague rules and concepts, which leads to
confusion on the exact approach to be applied by states against hate speech. Finally, these
treaties lack the enforcement mechanism to apply the rules against hate speech. This part
highlights these criticisms to illustrate why the IHRL framework does not function
against restricting hate speech.
With respect to the first drawback, there is no single definition for hate speech in
international law. Likewise, the ICCPR and its general comments do not adopt a
definition for hate speech, nor does the CERD convention define hate speech. However,
general recommendation number 35 established a general definition of racist speech by
stating that it includes racial attacks and any speech that attacks racial or ethnic groups. 70
Concerning the second point, there is a clear difference between the CERD and
ICCPR approaches to fighting the hate speech phenomenon. While the CERD requires
countries to punish incitement for racist ideas, the ICCPR only requires countries to
prohibit speech if it advocates for discrimination, violence, or hatred. The CERD
proposes a lower threshold for criminalizing racist speech, but this Convention fights
racist speech only and ignores other forms of hate speech such as religious hate speech. 71
However, the ICCPR takes a higher threshold that prohibits only without penalizing
advocacy of racist speech or national or religious speech if it leads to hatred,
discrimination, or violence. Still, it covers three types of hate speech racist speech,
national, and religious speech. 72 Michel Rosenfeld criticizes the CERD because it is
useful only to combat racist speech and not other hate speech forms. 73 The
criminalization of racist speech in article 4 of CERD hinders the effort to restrict and
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eliminate racist speech because state parties reserve this article based on free speech
protection. 74 The states members of this Convention are 182 states; Twenty states'
members reserved or made declarations on article 4. 75 Therefore, Rosenfeld argues that
the CERD is not effective in combatting racist speech because it obligates countries to
criminalize racist speech, and countries reserve this obligation. 76 Therefore, CERD is not
efficient in combating racist speech. 77 I suggest that the historical context in which racial
speech has led to crimes and genocide in our world led states to adopt CERD with this
view against racist speech restriction contrary to ICCPR's approach. This does not mean
that other hate speech types are not important or do not lead to harm, but countries that
have chosen racist speech only to be penalized in CERD because racist speech is
associated with a horror narrative to our societies.
Third, some authors criticize the international framework in fighting hate speech
because it calls to apply vague legal concepts to restrict hate speech. This opinion
suggests that adopting the concept of harm resulting from hate speech as some countries
call to restrict hate speech is not accepted. This is happening because, for instance,
Article 20/2 requires countries to prohibit hatred which is extreme emotion, which incites
hostility, and this article defines hostility here as harm. Therefore, this article prohibits
emotions rather than an actual act, so countries refrain from adopting such a rule because
it does not offer a solid rule prohibiting hate speech. 78
Finally, the international system against hate speech is voluntary, and little
incentive is available to make states willing to follow this system, so this has led to an
ineffective application of the rules against hate speech as this system lacks an
enforcement mechanism for IHRL treaties obligation. Furthermore, the reservation is
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available to many articles, making states avoid applying these treaties. 79 From this
illustration, I argue that the prohibition of hate speech in IHRL is not comprehensive
enough to eliminate this problem. Although the CERD convention offers prominent legal
rules against racist speech, it does not cover other kinds of hate speech. Furthermore,
gaps fill the ICCPR approach against hate speech that led states to refrain from restricting
hate speech. Due to the lack of a unified approach against hate speech, states used their
domestic philosophy to organize the freedom of expression and have refrained from
restricting hate speech. This will become clearer in the next chapter, which focuses on the
US’ approach vis-à-vis the freedom of expression and hate speech.
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III.

Freedom of expression in the US: limited restrictions on speech and absolute

protection for hate speech
The US legal system offers great protection for the freedom of expression with limited
restrictions on this right. The first amendment of the US constitution describes this right
as such: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." The US approach provides a good case study reflecting how this
system grants freedom of expression with minimum restrictions. In this chapter, I argue
that the USA model protects hate speech, and this system uses the freedom of expression
as a justification to promote racist and xenophobic speech. The mainstream literature and
the case law offer almost absolute protection of hate speech.
In the first section, I explain the general theories used to justify the freedom of
expression to show how these theories are used to protect hate speech even though this
speech is racist or xenophobic. In the second section, I analyze the main USA case law to
explain that this system is not concerned with restricting hate speech even though it
inflicts harm on other people. In the third section, I explain some of the opinions
expressed in literature that offer great protection for hate speech. These opinions use
liberal values to maintain racist speech. This chapter concludes with a discussion of how
the protection of hate speech in the USA has led to the encouragement of racism,
xenophobia, and sexism in society. Moreover, as a result, members of US society suffer
unprecedented harm.
A. General theories of freedom of expression: protection for speech which leads to
racism and discrimination
In this part, I explain the three theories of freedom of expression: the marketplace of
ideas, political speech theory, liberty theory, or as sometimes described as the noninstrumental values are as self-fulfillment, self-expression, and individual autonomy to
understand. These theories have shaped the current US philosophy on freedom of
expression. And in spite of these theories' prominent ideas about the protection of free
speech, these theories are used to justify racist and discriminatory speech in American
22

society. These theories disagree on the theoretical bases for protecting speech but share a
common view for protecting hate speech. In this part, I explain the dominant ideas of
these theories and the main arguments for protecting hate speech, and some of these
theories' criticisms.
1.The marketplace of ideas theory and normalizing radical ideas
The marketplace of ideas theory is an important theory developed by John Stuart Mill to
protect speech freedom. Mill’s theory explains that the main reason to protect the
freedom of expression is to reach the truth. 80 Through public debates between society's
members and exchanging opinions and ideas, society will reach the truth. According to
this theory, the truth or the right solution for any problem is objective, and these solutions
will prevail because people are rational enough to reach them. 81 People use their logic
and rational thinking to reach the truth. However, this view seems optimistic. This theory
calls for the protection of radical and racist ideas to reach this truth. In this part, I present
this theory's main ideas and explain the criticism of this theory to show how this theory
uses fallacies to protect hate speech.
This theory offers an essential theoretical framework for protecting the freedom
of expression and granting free speech without restriction. The most important aspect of
this theory is the protection of hate speech in society, as this speech helps to reach the
truth. This theory is calling for protecting opinions in public debates even though these
opinions contain extreme views. According to this theory, a radical opinion may contain
a degree of correctness, so it deserves to be protected as it is the potential for reaching the
truth. 82 Therefore, this theory grants radical views protection to be heard by the society
until it decides to reject this speech. Without allowing extreme opinions to be heard and
assessed by society, society may never reach truth or solutions to its problems because
the exchange of views, including unproven opinions, is accepted as it may lead to the
truth. 83 Although this theory's main ideas seem progressive because it protects the
essential right of speaking, many authors criticize this theory. I cannot entirely agree with
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this theoretical framework for two main reasons. It assumes that truth is reachable
through discussions only, and it offers hate speech an opportunity to flourish in society.
In this part, I explain these criticisms to prove my argument that this theory is not helping
free speech but rather normalizing radical speech.
There are many criticisms of this theory. These counter opinions disagree with
the theoretical framework as granting people the right to speak without any restrictions
may not lead to truth. Regarding the uncertainties of reaching the truth by exchanging
opinions among people, C. Edwin Baker disagrees with the market theory and claims that
the objectivity of truth is uncertain. He illustrates the "rejection of objective truth can
also be seen in the modern scholar's unwillingness to believe in Platonic forms or
intelligible essences. Instead, knowledge is dependent on the way people's interests,
needs, and experiences lead them to slice and categorize an expanding mass of sense
data." 84 Therefore, claiming that there is one truth that people can reach is not granted.
Also, the marketplace does not provide proof that this theory will lead to the truth. The
author argues against the idea that only through discussion can people reach the best
solution. 85 He explains that our perception of truth is not limited to discussion and
debates, but other means can affect our perception of truth like our experience and social
experience.
C. Edwin Baker argues that social experience is varied among people, so they have
a different perspective toward the truth. He proposes that discussions alone will not lead
to truth or changing people's perspectives on the truth. Furthermore, the author criticizes
rational thinking as a means of leading people to the truth. He explains that rational
thinking is not depending on progressive debates.
Instead, understandings will depend on the form and quantity of inputs,
on the mechanisms by which people process these inputs, and on people's
interests and experiences. Without the assurance of rationality as the
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dominant means by which people evaluate competing viewpoints, robust
debate cannot, in itself, be expected to lead to the best perspectives. 86
Baker defines rational thinking as a way people reach a logical answer to a problem, and
this way is affected by many factors, such as their social position, the quality of the data
they precisive, the surrounded propaganda. 87 All of these factors affect people's
rationality. 88
Another opinion is against hate speech protection under this theory framework
because it leads to harm. Alexander Brown argues that the suppression of speech
containing facts but causing harm is an acceptable price worth paying to avoid
anticipated harm. 89 Protecting minority groups from discrimination and violence are
important than allowing racist speakers to speak even if this speech reflects reality or
states a fact. 90 He explains that hate speech affects people's minds who listen to this
speech, which affects their personality and emotion and leads to the spread of haters in
society. Instead of reaching knowledge, this will lead to the spread of racism and
discrimination in society. 91 Therefore, these opinions contradict this theory because of
the holes in its framework.
In conclusion, this theory protects the freedom of speech as a way to the truth. This
theory says that people assess their problems through discussions and exchanging ideas,
and the most influential idea will prevail in the end. However, another view criticizes this
theory because it offers a limited approach to protecting freedom of speech. The critics of
this theory think we cannot reach the truth through discussion only. Our society is
complicated, so debating or exchanging opinions only will not solve our problems. Also,
allowing hate speech in public debates thinking it is essential for these debates is
incorrect. Hate speech never helps our society; on the contrary, it spread haters among
our society. Therefore, this theory helps to normalize radical speech by claiming that this
speech leads to truth, which is not correct.
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2.Political Speech Theory: when democracy legitimizes discrimination
The political speech theory is the second theory used to justify free speech to protect
democracy and justify hate speech. Although this theory's progressive ideas seem to
protect democracy and free speech, many authors use this theory as an important shield
against the restriction of hate speech. I argue that many opinions use the political speech
theory to justify freedom of expression, but this legitimizes discriminatory speech in
society. To support this argument, I illustrate the main ideas of this theory. Then, I
explain the justifications for allowing hate speech and some criticisms of these opinions.
Unlike the marketplace of ideas theory, which protects speech for reaching the
truth, political speech theory protects political speech only. Alexander Meiklejohn
introduced this theory as C. Edwin Baker explains Meiklejohn's argument as a theory that
rejects any law restricting extreme speech to protect the political decision. Through
debates and discussions on public issues, people can reach the best voting decision. 92
This theory proposes that debates must be protected so that democracy can work. The
protection of free speech is essential so that the people can equally participate in the
public forum. This theory is concerned with protecting the political debates of
individuals. 93 Alexander Brown illustrates another aspect of Meiklejohn's theory by
explaining that this theory calls for the democratic self-government of the society. This
means people take a self-decision in the elections, and these single votes are gathered by
authorities using the democratic process to present their own opinions, which produces
the collective decision. This system depends on free speech, and it must be protected for
each individual to acquire information and communicate with other people to present
their views. 94 Protecting speech linked to the political sphere will benefit people in
making voting decisions. 95 Wojciech Sadurski accepts Meiklejohn's arguments and
explains the importance of free speech to democracy:
Democracy requires that citizens be free to receive all information which
may affect their choices in the process of collective decision-making and,
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in particular, in the voting process. After all, the legitimacy of a
democratic state is based on the free decisions taken by its citizens
regarding all collective action. Consequently, all speech that is related to
this collective self-determination by free people must enjoy absolute (or
near-absolute) protection. 96
Democracy requires the government to protect free speech to ensure the legitimacy
of the government. This protection is offered to people when they are using their right to
criticize the government, and this protection is offered as a protection of the will of the
people from the government. This protection is a safeguard against the majoritarian
opinion. As a result, of these ideas, this theory, as James Weinstein explains, calls for the
protection of hate speech. It explains that this protection is necessary to ensure that all
speakers presented their points without censorship of their speech, even though their
speech is not welcome by the majority. 97 Hate speech can provide people with
information on public issues related to political decisions. Denying this speech, the right
to be presented to society can block people from accessing information and led the
government to control the political sphere. For these reasons, democratic values are
incomparable with a law against hate speech because it hinders some people's right to
manifest their ideas and acquire information.
Many authors disagree with this theory's propositions because it is limited to
political speech only and contradicts the democratic right of people to enact laws to
restrict harmful speech. This theory prioritizes political speech protection from
censorship; this could neglect the importance of the other forms of expression even
though they are significant in our lives. 98 Furthermore, a law against hate speech is
confirmed with the democratic process because "hate speech that causes or is likely to
cause a breach of the peace, can be justified on the democratic basis of ensuring that all
citizens enjoy real opportunities for contributing to the formation of public opinion." 99
Furthermore, blocking hate speech will not hinder people from accessing public debates.
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Therefore, a law against hate speech is entirely acceptable in a democratic society. 100
Thus, we can see that this theoretical framework is full of contradictions and fallacies. It
offers limited justification for the freedom of expression right as it protects political
speech only and protects hate speech.
3. Liberty theory: when values are manipulated to maintain racism and
discrimination
The third theory is the liberty theory, which has been developed by many authors based
on several justifications. This theory is essential now, and many American authors hold
this theory to justify freedom of speech. This theory protects the freedom of speech as a
value protected by liberal philosophy. This theory protects the individual rights to express
themselves and their views to reach self-realization of their existence. 101 This theory
protects the freedom of expression for various reasons. These reasons representing many
liberal values and norms, such as individual autonomy, reaching the truth, and
participating in the democratic process, are among the various reasons to protect free
speech. This theory plays a major role in protecting free speech ideas and prohibiting
censorship and speech restrictions. However, contrary to its principles, this theory is used
to protect discriminatory and racist speech. To understand how this theory has led to this
result, I illustrate this theoretical framework's main ideas; then, I explain the arguments
for protecting hate speech under this theory contrary to promises it offers.
This liberty theory uses prominent values to protect speech, contrary to the other
two theories. Protecting the individuals' right to express their personality and democracy
are among the reasons for protecting free speech. C. Edwin Baker explains Thomas
Emerson's argument as it calls for protecting the speech for three values: individual selffulfillment, reaching the truth, and participating in the decision-making that includes
political and cultural making. 102 These values are important for defending individual
voices against majoritarian voices. These values offer people the right to introduce their
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claims and opinions. This protection is granted by the democratic practice in any society
that protects individuals against the majority's oppression. 103
Thomas Scanlon describes self-autonomy as an important value for protecting
freedom of speech. He explains that self-autonomy protection is offered not for
protecting the speaker but for the listeners' autonomy. This theory offers this protection
as individuals are rational humans and deserve the right to choose what to hear. He
illustrates this idea:
An autonomous person cannot accept without independent consideration
the judgment of others as to what he should believe or what he should do.
He may rely on the judgment of others, but when he does so he must be
prepared to advance independent reasons for thinking their judgment
likely to be correct, and to weigh the evidential value of their opinion
against contrary evidence. 104
The government is not authorized to restrict speech; in this case, it undermines
individuals' right to choose what to listen to. 105 Regarding the protection of democracy,
Ronald Dworkin argues that democratic values protect an individual's right to speak, and
any democratic government must respect this right. Democracy obligates governments to
provide the right for freedom of speech and equally provide it to all society members. 106
He illustrates that a violation of this obligation could happen in case the "government
violates the basic command of equal treatment when "it disqualifies some people from
[expressing their views] on the ground that their convictions make them Unworthy." 107
This theory offers a justification for freedom of speech based on many well-developed
values among different societies. This theory tries to protect the freedom of speech based
on these values so that restriction on speech will violate these values. However, this
theory offers protection for hate speech, and these values are interpreted and used by
different groups to maintain racism and discrimination.
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On the other hand, the Liberty theory uses people's autonomy and self-fulfillment
to justify the existence of hate speech. This theory protects radical ideas and opinions
because people use this speech as a medium to deliver their views. C. Edwin Baker
explains that sometimes people use hate speech as an element for reaching others. 108 It is
accepted under this idea to use racist words or examples to illustrate a certain opinion.
Restrictions upon such speech are not accepted unless it is causing physical harm to other
people or restricting their liberty. 109 If this speech does not coerce people to make
decisions or choose their lifestyle, this speech cannot be banned. Baker defines Coercive
speech as interference with other choices and limited capacity to change a normal
order. 110 Therefore, people being offended by hate speech because it is against their
beliefs is not an acceptable reason for restricting hate speech. 111
However, Alexander Brown refutes this opinion and explains that hate speech is
coercive and must be banned. He claims that using hate speech leads to coercion by
spreading hostility and intolerance among people. In this case, speech leads to undue
influence on the people as it deduces people to reflect the speaker's will rather than their
own will. 112 This happens through a circulation of false rumors, which increases the
feeling of mistrust and hater to other groups. He considers this act to be coercive on the
people's will. To support this argument, for example,
suppose a speaker spreads false rumors about a practice of murdering
Christian children among a Jewish community in an attempt to promote
feelings of mistrust and hostility between Jews and gentiles and to bring
an end to the official policy of tolerance toward Jews. The speaker uses
falsehoods to manipulate the audience's mental processes and circulates a
stolen coroners' report about the death of a child without obtaining the
consent of the parents concerned. Surely this is no more than the
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speaker's intended method of involvement in the act of seditious libel and
is coercive. 113
Therefore, hate speech is not compatible with the autonomy of people principle. 114 To
conclude, this theory is used by many to justify hate speech in contradiction with the
main theoretical approach of protecting the people's autonomy. We cannot expect to have
autonomy or self-fulfillment when others are tortured and abused by hate speech.
Therefore, I think for the very reason that this theory protects free speech, it must restrict
hate speech.
In conclusion, we have seen three theories, the marketplace of ideas, the political
speech theory, and the liberty theory, and all of which agreed that the freedom of speech
is an important right that any society must respect. These theories offer the framework in
which the freedom of speech was developed, and many authors have used many of the
arguments presented by these theories to call for the protection of the freedom of speech
even if this speech uses hate or racist speech. As they are important to free speech, these
theories are dangerous because hate speech developed under these theories. In the next
part, I present the application of these theories in the judicial system of the US to explain
how these theories influence the current doctrine protecting hate speech in US case law.
B. US cases approach to protecting free speech: a progressive start has become a
drawback
The American approach toward freedom of speech is highly protective of this right and
prioritizes other norms and rights. There are three restrictions on the freedom of speech
developed by the US courts: obscenity, defamation, and speech that lead to clear and
present danger. 115 I argue in this part that the American case law offers absolute
protection of free speech and hate speech with minimum exceptions. To illustrate this
argument, I begin by providing a brief history of US case law concerning the freedom of
expression and explain the main views of this doctrine. Then I clarify the shift in this
view towards protecting hate speech and explain some court justifications for this
Id. at 62.
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approach. I achieve this by describing the American landmark cases for protecting hate
speech.
The American Court's history toward the freedom of expression and hate speech
has many phases and approaches, which has led to almost complete protection of hate
speech. The literature divides the USA free speech case history into three phases. The
first phase protected free speech from governmental restrictions. The Second protected
the minority right to speak from majoritarian oppression. The third, the right to speak and
the protection of this right with a minimum restriction. 116 This part illustrates how the
shift from the second era to the third era has occurred.
In the first era, American courts adopted a conservative approach toward freedom
of speech. In this era, the USA case law gave little attention to speech protection and
prioritized speech restriction in many cases. Jeremy Waldron explains the first
application of the first amendment as an administrative rule that regulates speech. 117
Courts used the first amendment to protect the publication of the press and opinions, but
it offered no further protection if speech opposed the government or the president. This
protection for the government was granted by courts' verdicts to protect it from
opposition speech, to ensure its legitimacy was maintained because political speech may
undermine governmental authority. 118 Therefore, the USA judges offered no special
protection for political speech that attacked the government or raised unacceptable
political messages against the government. 119
The second era, which protected the people's right to speak and oppose the
majoritarian government, was shaped in the mid-19th century. In the case of Stromberg v
California (1931), judges offered protection for political speech that included the raising
of a red flag as a sign of opposition against the government. 120 The court, in this case,
struck down a law that forbade the display of a red flag as an example of opposition to
the government. 121 This change came after many dissenting judges reject this doctrine. In
the case of Abrams v the United States (1919), Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes offered an
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important dissenting opinion that rejected the conviction of an activist through the use of
the espionage act. 122 This case involved a man who distributed a leaflet criticizing the
president for sending the army to the USSR to fight communism during World War I.
Justice Holmes thought that this man's act expressed a political opinion and did not
present any immediate danger. He called for the acceptance of this speech and offered it
protection in the free trade of ideas. In this case, he called for the noticeable idea of
protecting speech unless it led to clear and present danger. 123 He explained in this famous
verdict:
It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it
about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of
opinion where private rights are not concerned. Congress certainly
cannot forbid all effort to change the mind of the country. Now nobody
can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an
unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger that
its opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or have
any appreciable tendency to do so. 124
It is important to highlight that courts did not grant the protection of speech without any
restriction in this era, but the court restricted hate and racist speech as a grantee that a
balanced application of the free speech right and at the same time to protect the society
from a speech that could cause harm to other members.
Unlike the first era, this doctrine shifted in the second era to restrict hate speech. In
the case of Beauharnais v Illinois (1952), the court refused to grant protection for racist
speech. 125 This case concerned the conviction of a group leader for distributing a leaflet
that contained racist speech. The government arrested the man and charged him with a
law that criminalizes the publication of materials that contain racist utterances. The court,
in this case, held that it offered no protection for libelous utterances. 126 However, this
prominent start in the American case law doctrine that protected from hate speech later
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shifted to an approach that guaranteed that racism and discrimination would flourish in
society.
In the third era, in the 1960s, US case law which protected from hate speech was
transformed into the almost complete protection for hate speech. In Brandenburg v Ohio
(1962), in which group members of the Ku Klux Klan held a demonstration recorded for
television, the group's members used racist speech against Jews and black people and
called on the government to get them out of the country without a direct incitement to
violence. 127 The Supreme Court decided that the act of the KKK is hate speech against
blacks and Jews, but it is not an incitement to violence. The court clarified that the first
amendment uncovers advocacy for violence. In this case, the KKK was not seen by the
court to have incited violence, and so their activity was protected. 128 The court held in its
reasons to acquitted the defended that:
Since the statute, by its words and as applied, purports to punish mere
advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with
others merely to advocate the described type of action, it falls within the
condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Freedoms of
speech and press do not permit a State to forbid advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action. 129
However, according to this test, general hate speech is not banned if it does not lead to a
lawless act of violence. 130 The US courts followed this approach in 1977 in the case of
Smith v Collin. In this case a neo-Nazi group wanted to organize a demonstration with
swastikas, the Nazi symbol, and with demonstrators wearing the Nazi SS uniform, the
unit in the Nazi army used to target Jews during WWII, in Skokie, a city in Illinois. Jews
inhabited this city, and some of them were survivors of the Holocaust. Skokie's city
council issued a law to criminalize "promote and incites hatred against persons because
of their race, national origin, or religion." 131 The demonstration organizers filed a case
Supra note 1, at 254.
Id.at 254.
129
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
130
Supra note 97, at 12. See also Supra note 95, at 54.
131
Smith V. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
127
128

34

and argued that this act was not an incitement to violence as established by the court's
rhetoric to restrict speech. The constitutional court supported this opinion. It decided that
a march with a Nazi symbol in a neighborhood with Jews is not an incitement to violence
and allowed for this demonstration. 132
The same approach of protection of hate speech was repeated in the well-known
1992 case of RAV v City of St Paul, a juvenile and member of the KKK group, burned a
cross in a black man's backyard house. 133 The court decided the boy's conviction based
on a law criminalizing a cross burning is unconstitutional. The court contended that this
law targets a certain ideology and certain activity, and the constitution does not accept
this as a rule to restrict speech. 134 it expressed its refusal for the law in question by
illustrating:
The ordinance, even as narrowly construed by the State Supreme Court,
is facially unconstitutional because it imposes special prohibitions on
those speakers who express views on the disfavored subjects of "race,
color, creed, religion or gender." At the same time, it permits displays
containing abusive invective if they are not addressed to those topics. 135
The court held that protecting the group members affected by hate speech is an important
governmental interest. However, the court explained that "St. Paul's desire to
communicate to minority groups that it does not condone the "group hatred" of biasmotivated speech does not justify selectively silencing speech on the basis of its
content". 136 So, the court declared that the law in question is unconstitutional.
To understand the reasons for the previous decision, James Weinstein explains
that the American courts differentiate between content-based regulation and contentneutral regulation. 137 Content-based regulation is regulating a certain kind of speech or
activity or a certain message. 138 For example, the prohibition of using offensive symbols
or words is considered to be a content-based regulation that must be invalidated. The
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content-based regulation, in many cases, is considered to be unconstitutional. 139 The
content-neutral regulation is the regulation of speech regardless of the message of the
speech or time or the place of this message. 140 Therefore, we can conclude that there is no
specific restriction policy against hate speech.
Hate speech is protected under this doctrine if it satisfied two conditions: it
manifests a certain opinion. And it is not intended to harm. Furthermore, courts
maintained this approach in subsequent case law, but hate speech is restricted if it causes
the people to feel insecure or threatened. In the case of Virginia v Black (2003), which is
about burning a cross in the backyard of an Afro-American by a KKK group member, the
Court declared that burning a cross in and of itself is not an intimation to violence as the
KKK group are known to use such an act in their speech. However, in this case, the Court
held that burning the cross, in this case, is a form of treating people in a way that makes
them feel insecure. For this reason, the Court accepted that a law that restricts such an act
is accepted based on the evidence of intimidation that people feel from this speech. 141
Restricting hate speech in the previous case could be taken to represent a shift in
the US doctrine toward hate speech; however, it is not true. This doctrine did not shift to
restrict hate speech because this case considered the act of burning a cross
nondiscriminatory; rather, the effects of this act on people may justify restriction if they
feel threatened. The shift in this doctrine which is seen in the case Virginia v Black was
reversed by courts in the 2011 case of Snyder v Phelps. In this case, the court affirmed
the doctrine of rejecting the use of emotional harm as a basis for restricting hate speech.
This case is about a group of people motivated by a local church leader who used hate
speech at the funeral of an army soldier who died in Iraq. They accused the deceased of
homosexuality. They condemned the memory of the deceased and caused emotional
distress, according to the deceased father. Snyder, the deceased father, filled a case
against this group of protesters. The Court rejected the case and held that the father's
grievance and emotional distress failed to merit damages. The Court considered this
speech as a speech protected by the constitution. The Court considered this speech as
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protected speech under the US constitution, especially since this speech was about a topic
of public concern as it manifested the rejection of homosexuality in the US army. 142
Charles Lawrence II explains the court doctrine described as unconscious racism
that the courts unaware of its existence. The author explains that racism is deeply rooted
in society, and discrimination is unconscious among people. Governments and people are
unaware that their actions lead to racist utterance or act. He illustrates that courts assess
racism based on clear cases of intended motivation for racism without analyzing the issue
from the cultural perspective. Therefore, this led the Court to refuse many racism cases
because it identifies racism as a clear act. He explains, "the Court creates an imaginary
world where discrimination does not exist unless it was consciously intended. And by
acting as if this imaginary world was real and insisting that we participate in this fantasy,
the Court and the law it promulgates subtly shape our perceptions of society." 143 So, he
wants to
trigger judicial recognition of race-based behavior. It posits a connection
between unconscious racism and the existence of cultural symbols that
have racial meaning. It suggests that the "cultural meaning" of an
allegedly racially discriminatory act is the best available analogue for,
and evidence of, a collective unconscious that we cannot observe
directly. 144
Therefore, he explains that the US system tries to expose racism in-laws and cases by
identifying it through the existence of clear intent to racism; however, it ignores that
racism is rooted in the society, and many laws can lead to racism if it was interpreted
based on the cultural context of the US society. So, we can infer from this theory that the
cases in which hate speech was protected can be explained as a continuation of this
approach. Courts think that a law that restricts certain racist speech, such as burning a
cross, violates the freedom of speech right, but the Court ignores the fact that this act is
racist. The Court used the clear and present danger to restrict speech and refused any
alternative approach, which explains burning a cross act as a racist act as interpreted by
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society's culture. The Court lives in its fallacies about the society that is not affected by
racism and ignoring that racism has unconsciously existed.
In conclusion, the American case law doctrine has gone through many significant
phases, which has led to the current doctrine of protection of hate speech. Although this
system seems to be against hate speech, these courts shifted its doctrine into granting free
speech protection even though the speech may be racist or discriminatory against
minority groups. This shift in American case law doctrine did not happen separately in
isolation from societal changes in the society and literature that reflected growing
tolerance for racism and discrimination in society. These cases represent how American
society is willing to accept racism and defend people's right to undermine other society
members. In the next part, I introduce some of the literature which supports this doctrine
to see how this literature has presented its case to defend racism and discrimination
utterance.
C. American literature tolerating hate speech: some reasons and justifications
There are many arguments and justifications for protecting hate speech in American
literature, representing the mainstream. These opinions and justifications have not come
to existence without a prior convention of the superiority of a certain race or gender in
society over others. Therefore, they offer many reasons for justifying hate speech as this
speech represents their viewpoints of how the society should submit to specific speech
and a narrative that everyone should believe. The white male race's superiority and the
discrimination against other genders and races are the main features of this doctrine.
However, they represent the opinion that they respect the right of freedom of expression
to hide their true intentions. In this part, I argue that the current American doctrine
protects hate speech by claiming that this doctrine represents the societal choice toward
protecting free speech to hide their true intentions of protecting racism. To illustrate this
argument, I explain some of the arguments which support this view. Some opinions
explain that the norms adopted in society accept and justify hate speech. Other opinions
call for protecting hate speech as an important way to preserve the legitimacy of law in
society and ensure that individuals' viewpoints are presented equally in society.
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Some of the opinions call for the protection of hate speech because there is no
controlling norm in the society which decides which speech should be allowed or
restricted. Robert Post says that the definition of hate speech is complex. 145 He argues
using harm to define hate speech is not accepted. 146 Using insults or offenses and treating
them as hate speech will lead to uncertainty. He proposes that our social norms can
differentiate between outrageous speech and decent speech. These norms control the
identity of the people and shape their response. 147 Post says the community's norms
known to people are used in society to define extreme speech or everyday speech. 148 He
suggests that norms are intersubjective, which means "norms are not merely subjective;
they are instead 'intersubjective' because they refer to attitudes and standards that persons
have a right to expect from others." 149 It developed through social interaction and shared
experience, which developed between the members of society. It is like a common
language. He explains that the law offers an authoritative interpretation of these norms.
From this idea, the author concludes that the hate speech law enforces the norm
developed in society. 150 This norm is about protecting democratic legitimacy and the
government's prohibition from intervention in the public debates, so this explains why the
US doctrine prohibits hate speech law to protect these values. He illustrates the approach
of the Supreme court, which adopted this idea.
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to allow the state to enforce
community norms in public discourse. In effect the First Amendment
pressures the state to be neutral with respect to the many competing
communities that seek to control the law by enforcing their own
particular ways of distinguishing decency from indecency. 151
So, the government must remain neutral to these norms in public debate. 152 Post argues
that if the law prohibits hate speech based on preventing harm, it will be unconstitutional
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because there is no exact measure to this harm. 153 This opinion claims that our society is
so diverse that one group's single norm must not control the whole society. However, this
opinion disregards the fact that a norm against hate speech is a universal standard now.
International human rights law, as shown in the CERD framework, adopts a norm against
hate speech. This norm is essential to protect individuals or groups from this speech, and
many countries internationally accept it. The protection from hate speech is not limited to
certain groups, but it is a universal right granted to people regardless of their nationality
or race, and countries are obligated to follow this rule.
Other authors build their arguments for protecting speech and refusing to restrict
hate speech based on the protection of the law's legitimacy and the protection of
democracy in society. Ronald Dworkin contends that the restriction of hate speech will
affect the legitimacy of law as it restricts the opinions of people who may disagree with
anti-racist laws. 154 He explains that the restriction of hate speech would affect the
legitimacy of law by illustrating:
It would leave room only for the pointless grant of protection for ideas or
tastes or prejudices that those in power approve, or in any case do not
fear. We might have the power to silence those we despise, but it would
be at the cost of political legitimacy, which is more important than they
are. 155
Dworkin explains anti-hate speech laws are against the legitimacy of the law. People may
choose to enact these laws, but it will be against the principle of legitimacy. 156 The
legitimacy of law can be reached after all the points of view and opinions give the chance
to address society. He explains that restricting hate speech is against democracy because
it grants the people the right to present their opinions and restricts people from speaking
violates this principle.

157

Therefore, even people who choose to enact a law against hate

speech affect the legitimacy of law and democracy because it restricts certain opinions.
Furthermore, some authors build their arguments on the protection of hate speech
for the benefit of society. For instance, C Edwin Baker argues that hate speech helps
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society expose racism and enhances minority groups' situation.

158

The author explains

the importance of granting hate speech the opportunity to speak as it exposes this speech
to the society by illustrating that "allowing and then combating hate speech discursively
is the only real way to keep alive the understanding of the evil of racial hatred." 159 So,
society takes action against this speech. Also, the suppression of hate speech will lead the
radical groups to resort to extreme measures and violent acts against the minority groups.
Furthermore, the suppression of hate speech by law can have negative consequences
against the groups intended to protect because this law could suppress minority groups. 160
Wojciech Sadurski explains that silencing radical groups will not protect minority groups
or enhance their right to speak. He insists that the suppression of hate speech will not
protect the minority group's dignity. He explains that one way to protect minorities is to
use affirmative action by reducing the racist groups' right to speak and give the minority
groups an equal amount of space to speak. 161 To conclude, this opinion claims that
radical speech helps minority groups by giving them the chance to present their case to
society and protect them from violence if radical groups. This opinion uses unaccepted
arguments to present their case. They illustrate that hate speech is benefiting minority
groups rather than radical groups. This opinion differs from other opinions as it builds its
argument on defending minority groups rather than the idea of free speech or protecting
racist speech, which seems to be a solid argument.
In conclusion, the arguments supporting hate speech in literature and case law
falsely use society's norms that reject hate speech restriction and democracy to justify
hate speech. These arguments are false because either society's norms or the democracy
of any rational society could accept hate speech. It is not accepted to justify hate speech
and allow an attack on other races and groups without any reason. Furthermore,
restricting speech, which leads to clear and present danger, is not a solution to this
problem. Hate speech is like an enemy that can lead to significant pain to individuals that
cannot be repaired or forgotten. If wars inflict pains and wounds which cause everlasting
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pain, hate speech can impose the same effects on victims. However, the victims of hate
speech live in a worse situation than the victims of war. We can know who led to this
pain in war, and it can be held accountable for their actions, but in hate speech cases, this
literature and case law neglect this accountability and offer xenophobic protection. So,
these opinions negatively affect the situation of the victims and normalize racism in
society. Therefore, I highly reject these views, and in the next part chapter, I present the
main theories and other opinions which reject this doctrine and call for the restriction of
hate speech.
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IV. The restriction of hate speech: in theory and in practice as seen in ECHR
Many opinions now call for restricting hate speech. These opinions refute the mainstream
arguments which protect free speech without any restriction. These opinions offer a
theoretical approach to justify the restriction of hate speech for many reasons, such as the
harms inflicted on the victims and to protect society from the negative consequences of
this speech. In this chapter, I argue that hate speech must be restricted because it inflicts
unimaginable harm on victims of this speech, and freedom of expression is not an excuse
to permit hate speech. In the first two sections, I introduce some critiques of freedom of
expression in literature, such as the critical race theory and the feminism theory and their
justification for the restriction of hate speech. Then, I illustrate some counterarguments
that the literature offers against the mainstream opinions that accept hate speech. In the
third section, I shift focus to illustrating how the restriction of hate speech is not merely
theoretical, and international courts such as the European court of human rights (ECHR)
have adopted an approach to restricting hate speech. I argue that the ECHR approach
offers a framework that justifies the restriction of hate speech without violating the
freedom of expression. I focus on the case-law of ECHR, which has dealt with hate
speech and its justification and some of the critiques. To conclude, I propose that the
doctrine of absolute protection for freedom of expression is unworkable and leads to
oppression and harm, and a restriction on hate speech is needed.
A. The critical race theory justification for restricting hate speech
Critical race theory is a fundamental theory in the literature that calls for the restriction of
hate speech. In the mid-1970, this theory was developed in the US by groups of writers
who argued that the conditions in communities of the color situation have not improved.
They explain that the civil rights movement reforms in the 1960s have been largely
ineffectual as a society sunk in racism. This theory grew in the 1990s, and many authors
joined. This theory has some basic assumptions. Racism is deeply rooted in American
institutions and society, leading to its normalization. Therefore, this theory refuses the
spreading of racism in society. 162 In this part, I clarify the meaning of hate speech
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according to this theory and the arguments that restrict hate speech. Then, I illustrate
some of the counterarguments to the mainstream doctrine offered by this theory. I
conclude that this theory’s justifications offer a substantial ground to restrict racist
utterance.
1.Hate speech definition
Defining hate speech is a crucial element in understanding this theory. Many authors
define hate speech as attacking certain groups or particular genders or sexes. One author
explains that this speech targets certain features or qualities of a specific group. For
instance, hate speech calls for the deportation, exclusion, and segregation of other groups
from society. 163 Racist groups see minority groups or colored groups as an enemy within
a society that does not deserve equal rights equivalent to other society's members. 164 In
the same vein, Mari J Matsuda tries to construct a doctrine that stretches the first
amendment doctrine exceptions to include hate speech. 165 She illustrates three elements
of racist speech: "The message is of racial inferiority. The message is directed against a
historically oppressed group. The message is persecutory, hateful, and degrading." 166 In
this way, this theory offers some general guidelines for constructing the meaning of hate
speech and explains that this speech targets certain groups.
2.Opinions against hate speech
Regarding the arguments against hate speech, many authors explain that hate speech
inflicts harm on individuals and groups. Hate speech stigmatizes victims with a negative
image, leading to degradation and inequality, leading to violence and even extermination.
Jeremy Waldron explains how hate speech imposes a certain image that becomes a part
of our perception of certain groups. The dangers of hate speech against groups create a
factual claim against a certain group, creating a false impression. For example, to claim
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that black men are drug dealers and hustlers or claim that Muslims are terrorists are
among the examples that racists groups use to target these other groups. This speech
stigmatizes groups using certain negative images, so black or Muslim individuals suffer
as a result. 167 This happens because, for instance, racist groups use slogans that call for
deportation or exclusion of a certain group from the society, such as "Muslims out or no
Blacks allowed." 168 These ideas slowly become a normalized speech and ultimately
"become a permanent feature of the landscape" requiring members of minority groups "
to live and work and raise their families in a community whose public aspect was
disfigured." 169 Thus, hate speech affects minority groups' dignity and denies them the
opportunity to live in a peaceful society. Dignity in this context refers to the personal
status of the member of society in which he/she is treated by the society accordingly. 170
Dignity in this context means "basic social standing, the basis of their recognition as
social equals and as bearers of human rights and constitutional entitlements." 171
Therefore, this stigmatization creates a feeling of abnormality and unworthiness in
society's eyes, affecting the minority groups' dignity and leading society to treat them as
second-degree people who are not the bearer of rights equivalent to the other members in
the society. 172 In essence, hate speech leads to the degrading of an individual's dignity.
Degradation of individuals' dignity is not the only effect of hate speech, but this
speech also hinders victims from communicating with other society members properly.
The messages of hate speech undermine the minority groups in the society, which led
victims to feel that "others perceive them as falling short of societal standards, ones that
even the individual may have internalized." 173 So, victims suffer from depression and
mental illness. This stigmatization hinders the minority group members from engaging
with other groups in society. This happens because this speech undermines minority
group members leading to their voices and ideas often being seen as unimportant.
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Therefore, these group members refrain from speaking and engaging in public debates. 174
Furthermore, the racists and discriminatory members of society underestimate the views
of minority groups. Caroline West explains:
when members of a group generally held in low regard express an
unorthodox or unpopular view, that opinion is considerably less likely to
be attended to or considered—at least, absent a conspicuous counterveiling reason for thinking that the speaker in question has some special
domain-specific expertise regarding the particular subject matter. 175
For this reason, racist groups argue that people of color are nonintelligent beings which
affects their chance to be heard; on the contrary, other members of the majority in the
society are granted, according to this opinion, the chance to speak and have their ideas
and thoughts listened to. 176

Racist ideas influence society's members, so they

discriminate in their preference for listening to certain speakers and undermining
speakers of color. Thus, the sense of stigmatization is one form of harm that profoundly
touches the victims of hate speech. They feel in this speech that they are no longer
welcome members of the society, but rather like second-degree persons who are not equal
to other society members.
The harm caused by hate speech can lead to violence and sometimes catastrophe.
The spread of hate speech has a long-lasting effect on the stability of society. This speech
increases the haters and racism in the society, making society more vulnerable to racist
violence, and a climate of hate could lead to physical and emotional damages on victims
of this speech. This happens because the spread of hate speech in society normalizes
listening to hateful ideas, which increases the sense of inferiority of minority groups; this
gives the radicals the chance to commit violence against these groups. 177 In this case, the
society may accept these incidents of violence or find an excuse to accept them because
"freedom to espouse racist propaganda may contribute to extreme political action which
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is acceptable only because such attitudes and beliefs are prevalent." 178 This is not a
hypothesis. History is full of concrete examples in which the spread of racism and
discrimination in society led to unimaginable violence and genocide. For example, during
the 1920s and 1930s in Germany, the Weimar Republic protected the freedom of
expression and offered special protection for hate speech. Hitler took advantage of this
right and spread his racist and discriminatory ideas in Germany, which normalized the
hate propaganda that saw other minority groups as second-degree individuals who were
not equal to the Aryan race. After Hitler took power, his regime continued to embrace
racism and discrimination in society by issuing many discriminatory and racist decisions
targeting minority groups. 179 Society accepted these decisions or did not challenge them
because the society adhered to this speech and was willing to accept the racial superiority
of the Aaryan race over other minority groups, which justified these racist actions until it
led to the Holocaust. 180 This example shows that allowing hate speech in society could
lead to grave harm that any society or even individual humans would not accept under
normal circumstances. However, when hate speech becomes widespread in society, it
induces its members and to willingly accept these atrocities. Therefore, restricting hate
speech is a significant step that any society must take to save its members' lives and to
maintain stability.
Other authors reject this mainstream doctrine protecting hate speech and offer
counterarguments against hate speech protection. Mari J Matsuda is one such author who
illustrates how racism has become common practice and attitude in the US. She explains
that inferiority is deeply developed in society and "planted in our minds as an idea that
may hold some truth." 181 In the US, the mainstream white race doctrine implies that other
minority groups are uncivilized and not equal to other members of the society. They do
this, offering many justifications for the normalization of hate speech. Matsuda rejects the
white race doctrine and asserts that equality between people helps protect minority
groups from the negative outcome of hate speech. She insists that the restriction of hate
speech is essential to maintain equality, as reflected in this passage:
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The application of absolutist free speech principles to hate speech, then,
is a choice to burden one group with a disproportionate share of the costs
of speech promotion. Tolerance of hate speech thus creates
superregressivity—those least able to pay are the only ones taxed for this
tolerance. The principle of equality is violated by such allocation. The
more progressive principle of rectification or reparation—the obligation
to repair effects of historical wrongs—is even more grossly violated. 182
She is against opinions that reject government intervention to regulate hate or racist
speech. Matsuda explains that although government intervention may affect the
imaginary marketplace of ideas, it is important to restrict racism. Protecting this
marketplace of ideas and accepting racist speech leads to harm to minority groups and
individuals, so regulating this market through restricting hate speech is prioritized over
the freedom of speech. 183
A different point of view proposes that anti-hate speech does not affect the
legitimacy of law. This opinion is responding to Ronald Dworkin's argument that
explains that the hate speech law is illegitimate. According to the constitution, anti-hate
speech law does not affect the legitimacy of law because it is enacted accordingly to its
rules. For example, many countries have adopted anti-hate speech laws, and no one can
contest these laws' legitimacy. 184 Also, a law against hate speech will not affect the
situation of minority groups in society. 185 Claiming that this law may target minority
groups and hinder them from expressing their ideas and beliefs is not correct. 186 Hate
speech law can be used against minority groups in totalitarian or authoritarian states only,
but in democratic states that adopt the rule of law and human rights, a law against hate
speech is rarely used to attack the groups it is supposed to protect. 187 This is confirmed in
1992 Striking a Balance Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-discrimination
study:
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[I]n repressive societies, such as South Africa and the former Soviet
Union, laws against hate speech have indeed been deployed to stifle
dissenters and members of minority groups. Yet this has not happened in
more progressive countries. The likelihood that officials in the United
States would turn hate- speech laws into weapons against minorities thus
seems remote. 188
These opinions share the same idea that mainstream doctrine promotes fallacies to
protect hate speech. These mainstream doctrine arguments lead to the spread of hate and
racism in society. Protecting free speech, which includes racist ideas, in this case, is not
accepted by some authors who respond to these arguments by offering arguments that
support the restriction of hate speech. To conclude, the critical race theory framework
against hate speech protects society from violence and harms inflicted on victims. I think
It is no longer accepted in society that free speech is granted protection without any
restriction. In the next part, I explain the feminist perspective toward hate speech
restriction to explore other reasons for restricting hate speech.
B. The feminist approach against hate speech: a way to protect women from
discrimination
Feminist writers criticize hate speech because it calls for inequality against women and
stigmatizes women as sex givers as pornography shows. Pornography has rooted this
view in society. Feminist writers explain that freedom of expression is offered by
masculinity to protect only white men and normalize hate speech against women. Also,
the freedom of expression is granted to pornography, although it humiliates women and
promotes a particular image of sex performers. To understand the feminist critiques, I
briefly explain this theory's assumptions regarding freedom of expression and hate
speech. Then, I illustrate the harms of discriminatory speech on women.
On the one hand, feminist writers reject the absolute protection of freedom of
expression without restrictions because it oppresses women by using hate speech. They
explain that mainstream doctrine grants freedom of speech according to the white male
view in society. Susan H. Williams, for example, explains that authors build feminist
Id. at 64. See also this study in Sandra Coliver, Striking a balance Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression
and Non-discrimination, at 134-140 and at 208-220, Editor Human Rights Centre, University of Essex
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theory on certain assumptions. First, women are systematically oppressed in society by
men and denied equality in society. Second, society is constructed by masculinity to
adopt a certain reality about women and male privilege, undermining women's rights and
equality. She rejects the marketplace of ideas theory because it "sees truth as objective,
rationalist, universal, and representational works systematically to support gender
hierarchy." 189 This theory offers a justification for freedom of expression from the white
male view, ignoring the other views. Williams argues that our knowledge is socially
constructed and that the truth's objectivity and rationality are not correct because gender
hierarchy influences the construction of society. Our perception of the truth depends on
our knowledge shaped by our culture. Our culture supports moral and political patriarchy.
She explains why feminist theory rejects the marketplace of ideas:
[F]eminist critique does not merely argue that value judgments and social
goals are generally implicit in epistemological choices; it demonstrates
how a particular set of values and goals-those of gender distinction and
domination-are implicit in a particular epistemology. In short, the
Cartesian model of truth is not just epistemologically flawed, it is also
morally objectionable. 190
This opinion explains that people build the justification for freedom of expression on
certain assumptions about society and how it is shaped. From this view, the marketplace
of ideas theory offers a theoretical framework to justify discriminatory speech and
speech, which calls for inequality. Therefore, discriminatory speech is developed and
accepted by the general members of society.
Based on the previous explanation of the origins of discrimination against women,
Mary Anne Franks argues that this doctrine protects white men's speech even if this
speech is against minority groups or women. 191 This author criticizes the mainstream
doctrine, which protects the freedom of speech even though it uses abusive expression
against women. This doctrine allows the restriction of speech in case of defamation or
threat to violence, and no one argues that it affects freedom of speech. However, if
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speech is against women, it is rarely rejected. This happens because the white male is
dominant in the society and thinks that hate speech is normal in society if it is not against
this race, but if hate speech against women, it is accepted. 192
In addition to these views, another author argues that media platforms use the
freedom of expression to worsen women's image and stigmatizes them in a manner that
humiliates them. Kimberlè Williams Crenshaw describes three intersectionality
frameworks that affect the women of color's situation and explains how racist speech
contributes to this cycle. 193 She illustrates that the racist speech represents women of
color in mainstream media via a particularly stereotyped image. She illustrates that
women of color are in a triangle that contains the structural intersectionality or
dimension, the political dimension, and the representational intersectionality. She
explains that structural intersectionality means society’s members design the reasons for
oppression to keep women of color in this vicious cycle of oppression from different
economic and social factors. These factors range from "burdens of illiteracy,
responsibility for child care, poverty, lack of job skills, and pervasive discrimination
weigh down many battered women of color who are trying to escape the cycle of
abuse." 194 Political intersectionality is how politics and gender interact to affect women's
position in society.
The third element, representational intersectionality, is about women's image and
how it is articulated in society "to create unique and specific narratives deemed
appropriate for women of color." 195 These elements are gathered together to increase the
oppression of women of color and undermine their image in front of society, increasing
violence as a reaction to this speech.
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stereotypes women of color, and the elements of intersectionality, which "not only
represent the devaluation of women of color. They may also reproduce it by providing
viewers with both conscious and unconscious cues for interpreting the experiences of
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others." 197 Therefore, hate speech against women increases inequality and leads women
to suffer in an unjust society.
On the other hand, other feminist writers illustrate that freedom of expression is
used in pornography to humiliate women's image in society, so this speech uses freedom
of speech to impose pains on women. Catharine A. MacKinnon argues that the
constitutional protection of pornography makes men see women as sex objects. Men are
raised in their environment to see women in porn, so this image creates a sense of
domination over women. She explains that through pornography, women are humiliated,
while men enjoy these scenes. This is like a rapist who enjoys the raping of women. Porn
allows and normalizes the idea of seeing women in a position that humiliates them. 198
She calls for the restriction of porn because it inflicts harm on women. 199 Pornography
harms women because it creates a fallacy that the only purpose for women is to satisfy
men's sexual desires. Therefore, this view calls for the restriction of porn because it
causes harm and severe damage to women's image in society. 200
In conclusion, feminist writers see that many people commonly use freedom of
expression to protect hate speech, targeting women. Hate speech targets women by
degrading them, and so this affects their dignity. The feminist writers' views toward hate
speech are the same as the critical race theory. Both theories see hate speech as a way to
normalize the inequality and inferiority of certain groups and genders and inflict harm on
the victims. So, these theories strongly call for the restriction of hate speech.
To conclude these debates, the arguments for restricting hate speech are wellbalanced arguments that refute the mainstream’s scholarship and offer acceptable
justification for eliminating hate speech. The above-illustration shows that hate speech
leads to many devastating effects on minority groups and women. The harms of hate
speech exploit the victims' lives. It affects their souls, social image, and right to live in an
equal society like other society members. Therefore, the harms of racist speech are an
important justification to eliminate hate speech. In the next part, I explore the European
Court of Human rights (ECHR) cases to see a judicial system in which hate speech was
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restricted and refused. It is important to illustrate this system to see that hate speech
restriction is not theoretical, and courts can apply.
C. The ECHR cases against hate speech: a balanced approach against a complex
problem
The ECHR regime protects the freedom of expression unless speech calls for hatred or
discrimination. In hate speech cases, the court restricts this speech as the court adopts an
intolerant policy against racist and discriminatory speech. Although the court has not
adopted a clear definition of hate speech, it deals with hate speech based on a case-bycase approach and restricts hate speech based on this analysis. It focuses on the speech
context and its severity and consequence on society. 201 In this part, I argue that ECHR's
treatment of hate speech is a highly recommended approach to be followed by countries
because it has adopted an intolerant approach against hate speech. The court brilliantly
uses a pragmatic approach which is a case-by-case analysis, to assess the content and
context of the speech and restricts speech if it inflicts harm or leads to haters and
discrimination. This section demonstrates the ECHR doctrine in deciding cases related to
alleged abuses of freedom of expression. Then I illustrate some of the court cases in
which it restricts hate speech and its rationale. I explain some of the counterarguments of
the court’s approach. To conclude, the ECHR model is a suitable model for fighting hate
speech while recognizing some of its criticism.
In the cases related to the freedom of expression abuses, the ECHR evaluates
speech based on its conformity with article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (The European Convention). 202 Article 10/1 of The European Convention protects
the freedom of expression. There are three restrictions on exercising the freedom of
expression right reflected in Article 10/2, which states that:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary for a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
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integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or
rights of others. 203
Furthermore, the court allows a margin of appreciation to states to restrict
expression according to their legal system. This exception grant states the right to assess
cases according to their national laws and restrict speech if it contradicts their society or
culture. 204 The margin of appreciation is granted by ECHR only if the states present
interests and clarify the dangers that led them to restrict speech. 205 The court resorts to
already decided cases to qualify the speech. If the case law does not help, it analyzes the
context and its effect on society. 206 The court declares the inadmissibility of cases that
includes Holocaust denial and anti-Semitic speech. In these cases, the court refuses to
examine the content of this speech. The court uses article 17 of the European Convention
to reach this result. 207 In assessing speech, according to article 10 of the European
Convention, there are three approaches the court follows to examine hate speech based on
this article. First, it looks at the content of the speech. Second, it examines whether the
speech tends towards hate or racism. Third, the infers from this tendency whether the
speech indicates racial discrimination or hate. 208
To understand how the court applies these approaches, I explain some of the court
cases in which it has restricted hate speech based on article 10. The court mainly uses this
article to restrict speech that calls for hatred and discrimination against other social
groups. Then I explain some cases in which ECHR uses Article 17 of the European
Convention to restrict speech, such as Holocaust denial and anti-Semitic speech and some
of the court's justifications and some of its criticisms.
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1.ECHR case law under Article 10 of the European Convention and its criticisms
In cases related to the application of article 10 of the European Convention, the court
restricted hate speech that called for haters against minority groups. In the case of Feret v
Belgium, a Belgian politician delivered a racist speech against the Muslim minorities in
his country and accused them of terrorism. He also claimed that asylum seekers and
refugees are radicals and encourage violence and terrorism. Belgium filed a case against
this politician by charging him with violating a law that criminalizes racist speech. The
national court found him guilty and penalized him. The defendant then filed a case with
the ECHR and argued that he did not incite violence, but rather he expressed a political
view. The ECHR upheld his conviction. The court analyzed the case from the lens of
article 10 and found that there was no violation from Belgium. The court explained that
incitement does not relate to violence:
[I]ncitement to hatred did not necessarily require the calling of a specific
act of violence or another criminal act. Attacks on persons committed
through insults, ridicule or defamation aimed at specific population
groups or incitement to discrimination, as in this case, sufficed for the
authorities to give priority to fighting hate speech when confronted by the
irresponsible use of freedom of expression which undermined people's
dignity, or even their safety. 209
The court illustrated that this speech affects the society's unity and living peacefully, and
this speech affects the democratic institution which is required to protects these values. 210
Recently, the rejection of hate speech against homosexuality was followed by the
court in Vejdenland v Sweden. The defendants, who are student members in a group
called Vejdenland, distributed a leaflet containing homophobic speech. The national
authorities brought a case against them for agitating against a national or ethnic group.
The defendants filed a case in the ECHR and argued that they discussed homosexuality
and its effects on society without intending to humiliate its members. They claimed that
they were bringing this issue to the public for debate only. The court found no violation
of article 10 because this speech because was offensive against others. The court
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illustrated that inciting to hatred "does not necessarily entail a call for an act of violence
or other criminal acts. Attacks on persons committed by insulting, holding up to ridicule
or slandering specific groups of the population can be sufficient for the authorities to
favour combating racist speech in the face of freedom of expression exercised in an
irresponsible manner." 211 Therefore, the court upheld the conviction.
In spite of ECHR’s active approach against hate speech, many writers reject the
ECHR court’s approach to applying article 10 of the European Convention and restricting
speech related to public concerns and political speech. They argue that public debates and
political speech must be granted in society a high level of protection because a society
must ensure that there is space for people to speak and exchange their opinions. People
feel that the government respects “pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness” among
society members. 212 The ECHR explains that the right of freedom of expression under the
Convention extends to the expression of speech " which are shocking, offensive and
disturbing." 213 In this line, Stefan Sottiaux argues that the court restricts speech related to
public debates that threaten freedom of expression. He opposes the court approach Feret
v Belgium because, in this case, the speech acts that were involved were never intended to
incite haters or discrimination. Sottiaux explains that the language used by the speaker in
this case never "aimed not so much at inciting the members of the general public to act in
a racist or discriminatory manner, but at criticizing the sitting government's immigration
policies as part of an electoral strategy." 214 Therefore, in this case, the court’s decisions
were disagreed by Sottiaux because the court inferred haters and discrimination from a
political speech merely discussing a public issue without intending to harm anyone.
2.ECHR case under Article 17 of the European Convention and its opposition
In cases that involve speech, denying the Holocaust, or promoting neo-Nazi ideology,
Article 17 is often used to refute these cases. 215 Article 17 states that:
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Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein
or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the
Convention.
For instance, in the 2003 case of Garaudy v France, an author published a book that
denies the Holocaust. He was convicted based on a law that criminalizes denial of crimes
against humanity and the publication of defamatory statements. The defendant filed a
case in the ECHR. The court considered this expression "denying the reality of clearly
established historical facts, such as the Holocaust, as the applicant does in his book, does
not constitute historical research akin to a quest for the truth." 216 Instead, it holds a
certain view and ideology of Nazi, which calls for haters as it claims that the victims have
falsified the Holocaust. The court explains that "denying crimes against humanity is,
therefore, one of the most serious forms of racial defamation of Jews and of incitement to
hatred of them. The denial or rewriting of this type of historical fact undermines the
values on which the fight against racism and anti-Semitism are based and constitutes a
serious threat to public order." 217 So, the court considered that this expression incites
individuals to violence and supports racism, so the court refused to examine the case in
light of article 10 of the European Convention and declared the case inadmissible in light
of article 17.
The court confirmed this refusal of hate speech in the case that involved hate
speech against the Muslim minority. In the 2010 case of Le Pen v France, the defendant,
who is president of the French “National Front” party, in an interview with the Le Monde
newspaper, used racist speech against migrants and Muslims and rejected Muslims'
existence in France. A French court convicted this party member for incitement of hate
speech. He, in turn, filed a case in front of the ECHR. The court illustrated the use of this
hate message which threats the dignity and the security of a Muslim minority. Also, this
speech, according to the court, could affect the stability of French society. It explained
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that “the Court found that the interference with the applicant’s enjoyment of his right to
freedom of expression had been “necessary in a democratic society.” 218 The court
accordingly rejected his complaint. 219
Furthermore, the court used article 17 to dismiss cases in which the plaintiffs use
hate speech against minority groups.

In the 2004 case of Norwood v. the United

Kingdom, the British party member of British National Party, a right-wing party, set up a
billboard in the window of this flat with the word "Islam out of Britain- protect the
British people," 220 this person was convicted by the use of anti-discrimination laws in the
UK. He filed a case in front of the ECHR. The court said his conviction, according to
British law, was appropriate. The court considered this speech as "incompatible with the
values proclaimed and guaranteed by the Convention, notably tolerance, social peace and
non-discrimination." 221 Thus, it was not covered by treaty protection because it abuses
others' rights, according to art 17. This case shows how the court engages clearly with the
hate speech problem. This case illustrates that the court rejects hate speech that targets a
certain group based on religion. For this reason, the court rejected the defendant's case
according to article 17.
Many authors reject the use of article 17 of the European Convention in cases
related to freedom of expression because it threatens this right. Lemmens explains that
article 17 was adopted in the European Convention to protect from the abusing of rights.
He criticizes the ECHR because it uses this article to block certain types of speech, i.e.,
speech denying the Holocaust and anti-Semitic speech, without analyzing the merits of
the case according to article 10 of the European Convention. 222 Article 17 is dangerous
on freedom of expression because it allows the states to restrict speech based on the type
only without justifying its interference in restricting speech. In line with this view, David
Keane argues that article 10/1 protects hate speech, and article 10/2 offers restrictions to
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speech. 223 Article 10/2 justifies the restriction of the speech on three conditions:
prescribed by law, necessary in a democratic society, and for the “interests of national
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of
others.” 224 Therefore, ECHR must restrict speech according to this formula. However,
ECHR applies to article 17 in denying Holocaust speech and anti-Semitic speech and
requires countries to prove only that this speech falls under these categories without
analyzing the speech context or content according to the article 10 formula. 225 He
disagrees with the ECHR approach in these cases because it leads to:
loss of any degree of proportionality; interference is justified because of
content, not because of any balancing act with a conflicting right, such as
equality. The State would not be required to show that there was a
pressing need for an interference – it would be required to prove only the
content of the speech in question and not the effect of that speech. 226
Aoife O'Reilly sees the use of article 17 in restricting speech as a threat to political
speech. He contends that the dismissal of the Norwood v England case by the ECHR
destroyed the freedom of expression right as the court blocked political speech that may
be unsavory but did not deserve to be restricted by the court under article 17. He asserts
that
displaying a poster that represented the party's concern that Britain was
under threat from Islam. This was, by its very nature, political speech. In
addition, whether the existence of a poster in the window of a flat in a
village in Shropshire can reasonably be construed as an attempt to
destroy the rights and freedoms in the Convention is surely dubious. 227
Thus, this opinion insists that this speech should have been analyzed under article 10 of
the European Convention rather than analyzed under article 17.
In addition to the opposition for the court’s approach in deciding case according to
articles 10 and 17, other opinions claim that the ECHR uses a vague approach toward the
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definition of hate speech, which has led to ambiguous application in cases. One author
posits that the lack of clarity of the definition of hate speech is noticeable in the cases
decided by the ECHR. The court deliberately avoids defining hate speech. 228 This has led
to uncertainty regarding the exact approach that the court follows to treat hate speech
cases. 229 For instance, in Perincek v. Switzerland, the court refused to restrict clear hate
speech denied the Armenian Genocide. In this case, a Turkish citizen denied this
Genocide at a conference in Switzerland. Switzerland filed a case and convicted him for
advocating racist nationalist speech. The plaintiff, the Turkish citizen, filed a case in the
ECHR, where the court found that the Swiss government violated article 10 because this
expression related to public interests entitled to protection, and a mere denial of a
historical incident does not constitute hate speech. It requires in the act of denying
genocide, "to incited to hatred towards a specific group, it could lead to a climate of
hostility and violence, and was thus properly criminalized. Conduct that was disrespectful
or degrading for a group of people could properly be outlawed." 230 The court acquitted
the defendant. From this case, it is clear that the court contradicts its prior case law,
which considered the Genocide denial as a mere act of hate speech that should be
restricted. Therefore, this could lead us to infer that the court applies an inconsistent
definition to hate speech.
From these discussions, the court’s approach towards hate speech fluctuates
between prohibiting hate speech cases or accepting these cases and analyzing their
content from a Convention perspective. The court clearly refuses anti-Semitic speech
cases and declares them inadmissible, but in other forms of hate speech cases, the court
analyzes this speech. The court approach in the cases that do not involve anti-Semitic
speech focus on the context of the speech and its effect on society and victims. I believe
that this approach can empower the victims of hate speech by protecting them from racist
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and discriminatory speech. Although the court does not provide a straightforward test for
hate speech, the main approach adopted in these cases leads to prominent effects. The
case-by-case analysis is the most acceptable way to examine the hate speech problem.
The court’s approach to dealing with this kind of problem is pragmatic as it does not
examine the actual act but rather examines the context and the effects of the hate speech.
The court’s approach, which adopts article 17 of the European Convention, is also an
acceptable adjudication model. This model rejects to examine cases if these cases lead to
the destruction of the rights and freedoms in the Convention.
I also reject the opinion which suggests that if a speech is related to public issues
or political speech, it should be protected even though this speech calls for haters and
discrimination. A speech which calls for haters and discrimination leads to harms on
victims of this speech and increase the climate of hate in the society as discussed in
section one and two of this chapter. To conclude, I believe the ECHR’s approach is a
balanced model in fighting hate speech, and countries, especially those which currently
tolerate hate speech, could benefit from the ECHR’s experience to restrict hate speech.
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V. Conclusion
The problem of hate speech is a contemporary problem facing societies for many decades
because it is associated with freedom of expression rights. Therefore, this paper calls for
adopting a unified approach against hate speech.

IHRL plays an important role in

guiding states and their Constitutional courts, especially on the exact approach that
should be followed to deal with hate speech. The problem of hate speech is a specific
problem of a more general problem that the Constitutional courts face. These courts try to
balance between individuals’ rights against society or minority interests. Therefore, IHRL
should provide a unified code to delimit judicial discretion. We can see that the lack of
common international practice has led to different approaches applied by states to
organize freedom of expression and its restrictions. In the US, freedom of expression is
used in this society to justify hate speech, and this society gives little attention to the
minorities affected by this speech. Although hate speech leads to harms to the victims,
the US offers greater protection for this speech. Other opinions, such as critical race
theory and feminist theory, try to restrict hate speech by focusing on how hate speech
harms the victims. The ECHR supports this approach and restricts hate speech in many
cases, which, in my opinion, is a good model of adjudication that states can follow if they
want to restrict hate speech.
I believe that the restriction of hate speech is necessary for any society to protect
the victims from the harm it inflicts on them. Also, the restriction of hate speech leads
minority groups to feel secure and tolerated by society if they see that society is against
this kind of speech. I think our world now needs to take actual steps to fight racism and
discrimination, which has spread in recent years. It is no longer acceptable to protect hate
speech under any justification, and states that tolerate hate speech should rethink their
approach to restricting hate speech. The restriction of hate speech is important to protect
individuals and societies from the harms of hate speech.
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